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Abstract 
The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate 
about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM 
deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about 
which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a 
unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the ToM 
deficit that appeals to a domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. First, I discuss what it means 
to consider autism as a spectrum rather than as a unified disorder. Second, I argue for the 
plausibility of the modular explanation on the basis that autism is better considered as a spectrum 
disorder. Third, I respond to a potential challenge to my account from Philip Gerrans and Valerie 
Stone’s recent work (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008).  
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 “Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder” 
 
0. Introduction 
Autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind (e.g., Carruthers 
2006a, 18; Samuels 1998, 597). Most involved in the debate do not question whether there are 
modules for some lower-level input systems like vision (e.g., Fodor 1983). What is at stake is 
how much of the mind is modular. For autism, the question is whether the theory of mind 
(hereafter ToM) deficit displayed by persons with autism is best explained by appeal to some 
domain-general process or to a domain-specific ToM module. In this paper, I argue that the shift 
from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of 
the explanation of the ToM deficit that appeals to a domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. 
First, I discuss autism considered as a spectrum disorder rather than as a unified syndrome and 
then discuss briefly how I will be using ‘module’. Second, I argue for the plausibility of the 
modular explanation on the basis that autism is better considered as a spectrum disorder. Third, I 
respond to a potential challenge to my account from Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone (Gerrans 
2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008), focusing on their most recent 
work (2008). 
 
1. Autism and Modularity  
1.1 Autism as a Spectrum 
The DSM-IV-TR (hereafter DSM) defines autism as a pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) 
characterized by impairments in social interaction and communication as well as by “restricted 
repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities” (APA 2000, 75). Other 
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PDDs include Rhett’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and 
PDD not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). The first two impairments that characterize autism, 
i.e., social interaction and communication, are qualitative impairments, i.e., impairments 
differing in kind from abilities exhibited by individuals who have undergone typical 
development.  
To be diagnosed with autism an individual must exhibit a total of six behavior types from 
the twelve listed in the DSM, including at least two from the first group (social interaction) and at 
least one from the second (communication) and one from the third (restricted repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns). The ToM deficit is not presently an explicit component of the diagnostic 
criteria, but these criteria do relate to this deficit (e.g., difficulty in pretense).
1
  
Though the DSM identifies autism as a disorder, it is important to urge caution to those 
who act as if it were a unified syndrome with a high degree of similarity among individuals 
diagnosed with it. The potential for a great degree of variance among those diagnosed with 
autism should be evident from merely examining the possible combinations of the twelve 
behavior types that individuals with autism can have, but this variance has not always been 
recognized. 
Early work by Leo Kanner (1943) treated autism as a unified syndrome. Kanner posited 
that the children he studied came “into the world with innate inability to form the usual, 
biologically-provided affective contact with people…” (Kanner 1943, 250). Since Kanner’s early 
work, researchers have recognized the diversity among individuals with autism. Autism is now 
better described as a spectrum disorder rather than a unified syndrome.
2
 But a spectrum disorder 
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 For additional diagnostic criteria, see the DSM-IV (APA 2000, 75).  
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 Psychiatrists distinguish between categorical and dimensional classificatory systems. The 
DSM-IV is a categorical system that “works best when all the members of a diagnostic class are 
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is not simply a continuum from more to less severe cases of a common deficit or set of deficits; 
rather, autism is a complex disorder better conceptualized in terms of combinations of various 
symptoms than as a unified syndrome (Wing 1988). This shift to focus on symptoms is not 
surprising, since similar transitions have occurred in the history of psychiatry with other 
disorders, e.g., schizophrenia (Coltheart & Langdon 1998). 
Viewing autism as a spectrum rather than as a unified syndrome has important 
methodological implications for psychological theory and clinical practice as well as for the 
plausibility of the explanation of the ToM deficit that I will advance, and I will discuss these 
below. For now, it is important to highlight that given autism’s characterization as a spectrum it 
should be possible, in principle, to find any one of the three main areas of deficits, as well as the 
individual sub-areas, dissociated from the others (see Bishop 2000, 259-260). Such higher-
functioning individuals would have deficits in only one or two of the three major deficit areas 
listed in the DSM, displaying some of the behaviors of those on the autism spectrum but not 
falling under the autism spectrum category. Such individuals are not, in fact, uncommon (Bishop 
2000, 260). 
Asperger’s disorder is one such case of individuals who share some but not all symptoms 
with individuals diagnosed with autism. Many individuals diagnosed with PDD-NOS do as well. 
The purpose of this paper is not to enter into the controversy surrounding differentiating 
Asperger’s disorder from higher-functioning autism (Klin et al. 1995; Klin & Volkmar 2003). 
This controversy concerns whether the DSM should give Asperger’s disorder its own category.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
homogenous, when there are clear boundaries between classes, and when the different classes are 
mutually exclusive” (APA 2000, xxxi). Dimensional systems, however, are for disorders on 
continua. The current DSM-V task force is investigating how the “concept of spectrum disorders” 
can work alongside the traditional Axis I-Axis II distinction (Kupfer et al. 2002, xx). 
3
 See Simon Baron-Cohen’s (2009) recent New York Times commentary. 
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However, most in this debate agree that Asperger’s is “on a phenomenological continuum 
with autism” (Klin et al. 1995, 1129). That is, most agree that the difference between autism and 
Asperger’s is a difference in degree.4 The dispute concerns whether the differences in degree 
between higher-functioning persons with autism and those with Asperger’s disorder are 
sufficient to warrant placing the latter within its own diagnostic category. My point is that 
whether one uses the label ‘Asperger’s’ or ‘autism’, there are individuals—those diagnosed with 
Asperger’s—who share the majority of the observed behavioral deficits exhibited by individuals 
with autism, since the two disorders are currently differentiated only by level of intelligence and 
the onset of language. My focus is on subjects among these individuals who exhibit a ToM 
deficit in the absence of many other deficits. 
 
1.2 ‘Module’ and Higher Cognitive Processes 
The term ‘module’ is used in various ways in the literature, so it will be useful briefly to explain 
how I use it. Fodor’s influential book The Modularity of Mind (1983) argued that lower-level 
input systems, e.g., vision, are modular but that “central systems” are not, e.g., those that fix 
perceptual belief. Fodor included only these peripheral input systems in his account of 
modularity because of the manner in which he characterized ‘module’. He identified nine 
characteristics of modular systems; key among these was the notion of “informational 
encapsulation,” which Fodor took to be the most important feature of modularity (1983, 37). A 
module is informationally encapsulated “if it operates on proprietary input and ignores available 
information that is relevant to the computation at hand” (Carey 2009, 9). The well-known 
                                                          
4
 Baron-Cohen (2009), however, argues that this is still an open question because there has been 
insufficient research into possible biological differences between individuals with autism and 
with Asperger’s.  
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Müller-Lyer illusion is a common illustration of such encapsulation. Much of the mind is not 
modular on Fodor’s (1983) account.  
More recently, evolutionary psychologists have proposed what many call the massive 
modularity thesis (MMT) (Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Machery & 
Barrett 2006). On the MMT, many of the abilities that Fodor (1983) argued were subserved by 
domain-general systems are subserved by domain-specific modules. On one such representative 
view, 
[…] humans have a faculty of social cognition, consisting of a rich collection of 
dedicated, functionally specialized, interrelated modules […] organized to 
collectively guide thought and behavior with respect to the evolutionarily 
recurrent adaptive problems posed by the social world. (Cosmides & Tooby 1992, 
163) 
One important difference between Fodor’s (1983) account and the above interpretation of the 
MMT, beyond that the latter argues that the mind is much more modular, is that for the latter 
whether a module is informationally-encapsulated depends on its particular functional 
specialization (Barrett & Kurzban 2006, 629).
5
  
I must make two further distinctions regarding the MMT:  first, it is independent from 
claims of innateness; and second, a module individuated in terms of its functional specificity 
does not imply that there is a single, distinct anatomical realization of that capacity in the brain. 
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 Critics of MMT often presuppose without argument what they take to be Fodor’s view about 
informational encapsulation, i.e., that it is a necessary condition, leading them to argue that 
domain specificity would most often not be adaptive (see, e.g., Gerrans 2002, 310). Many have 
taken Fodor (1983) to be arguing that informational encapsulation is a necessary condition for a 
module, but Max Coltheart (1999) argues that on Fodor’s account informational encapsulation 
was only a characteristic or “typical” feature of a modular system and, in fact, Fodor does argue 
that the “notion of modularity ought to admit of degrees” (Fodor 1983, 37). 
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Some favoring the modular explanation for the ToM deficit in persons with autism have 
supposed that this module is innate (cf. Baron-Cohen 1998, 182-184). But the version of the 
MMT assumed in this paper is compatible both with the view that argues that such modules are, 
at least in part, innate (Baron-Cohen 1998, 184; Leslie 1987, 424) and with the view that 
modules arise through a complex developmental path (see Machery forthcoming; contra 
Karmiloff-Smith 1998).
6
 The MMT is designed to explain the cognitive architecture of the mind 
regardless of whether it arises via innate modules or developmentally-constructed modules (see 
Barrett & Kurzban 2006, 638). 
Second, the view of ‘module’ that I assume does not require that each functional module 
be realized in a single area of the brain. Instead, a functional module could be distributed across 
areas in the brain that together contribute to that function. Some make inferences from functional 
modularity to anatomical modularity (see Bergeron 2007; Carrington & Bailey 2009), but this 
additional step is not required to argue that the ToM deficit in autism is best explained by a 
higher-level, domain-specific ToM module. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Clinical Implications of Considering Autism as a Spectrum  
I argue that viewing autism as a spectrum disorder instead of as a unified syndrome increases the 
plausibility of the modular explanation of the ToM deficit. Many philosophical discussions of 
autism fail to recognize the significance of conceiving of autism as a spectrum, so the present 
section is designed to fill this lacuna.  
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 However, Karmiloff-Smith (2009, 59) has recently argued that her “neuroconstructivist” 
account accommodates modularity in the adult brain, insisting that it would arise during the 
“ontogenetic process of gradual modularization.” 
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2.1 Diagnosing, Intervening, and Discovering  
I will now distinguish three different goals for which one could use studies of individuals 
with autism:  developing diagnostic criteria, designing clinical interventions, and discovering 
cognitive architecture.  For each I will highlight the inference involved, but the first goal and the 
last goal are most relevant to my argument in the next subsection. In discussing these three goals, 
I will focus on two types of studies in which one could engage. The first type examines an 
individual or individuals with a specific deficit, and the second examines a heterogeneous group 
with overlap in key deficits.  
If one wants to develop valid criteria for diagnosing individuals with autism, the latter 
type of study will help provide useful diagnostic guidelines for clinicians. Studying such a group 
with overlapping symptoms will help you discover what characteristics, on average, will result in 
successful diagnoses in clinical settings, as I will discuss in examples below. The goal in 
developing and evaluating such criteria is to provide clinicians with broad categories that will 
capture a range of behaviors. A successful diagnosis by means of such categories occurs when a 
patient is identified as exhibiting behaviors fitting within the range of behaviors of a certain 
disorder X and, after being diagnosed, the disorder X is predictive of that patient’s future 
behaviors. We must use group studies to develop such criteria because we want to provide 
clinicians with the average range of behaviors and symptoms in the population so that they can 
identify these in patients.  
One widely accepted way of evaluating the validity of diagnostic criteria is to conduct 
large-scale, longitudinal studies of individuals and determine if the criteria reliably predict future 
episodes of the behavior in question as well as its occurrence in co-twins (Robins & Guze 1970). 
Attempts to clarify the DSM diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder have done just this. 
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For example, Kendler & Gardner (1998) studied 2,163 female subjects to determine whether 
several of the current major depressive disorder criteria, i.e., number of symptoms, duration, and 
level of severity or impairment (see APA 2000, 369ff), would accurately predict future episodes 
of major depressive disorder as well as the risk for the disorder in a co-twin.  
Kendler and Gardner found that criteria different from or below the DSM-IV threshold 
criteria were more useful than those in the DSM-IV:  “Syndromes that met fewer than five 
criterion A symptoms, lasted for less than 2 weeks, or were formed of symptoms that were quite 
mild or produced no impairment had considerable predictive and familial validity” (1998, 174). 
When arguing that a set of diagnostic criteria is valid, like in this example, one makes an 
inference from their predictive power in group studies to their predictive power in the general 
population (an inference that moves from a claim about a group to a claim about a group). In the 
next subsection, I will discuss how researchers have criticized and refined the diagnostic criteria 
for autism in much the same way. 
When intervening in a clinical setting it is necessary to catalogue each individual’s 
symptoms when he or she presents for treatment, but one still needs broad categories in 
guidebooks like the DSM for diagnosing. Klin et al. make a similar point relating to Asperger’s: 
Given the prevailing difficulties in the definition of [Asperger’s] and the great 
heterogeneity of the condition, it is crucial that the aim of clinical assessment be a 
comprehensive and detailed profile of the individual’s assets, deficits, and 
challenges, rather than simply a diagnostic label. (2003, 4) 
These two foci—cataloguing individuals’ symptoms for interventions and using broad diagnostic 
categories based upon large-scale, longitudinal studies—are obviously not mutually exclusive. 
My point is to emphasize that one must engage in the first when intervening but in the second 
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when developing criteria for diagnosing. When one intervenes one makes an inference from a 
particular patient’s array of deficits and life situations, and the interplay between these, to what 
interventions will be successful for that patient (an inference that moves from a claim about an 
individual to a claim about that same individual). 
One might argue that in designing an intervention one really seeks a maximally specific 
class, given what one knows. I have characterized this sort of inference as an individual-to-same-
individual inference because there are often many historically contingent factors relevant to the 
intervention a clinician crafts (e.g., the loss of one’s job during an unanticipated economic 
recession right after one’s child contracts a terminal illness). In the case of such unique historical 
contingencies, the maximally specific class would have only one member, i.e., the particular 
patient. If we catalogued only a patient’s psychological deficits, viewing the crafting of 
interventions as seeking a maximally specific class would seem a correct characterization since 
there would be other members in such a class who would require the same intervention (as with 
Hempel’s example of penicillin-resistant streptococcus; see Salmon 2006, 54ff). However, since 
we take into account not only the patient’s psychological deficits but also the patient’s social and 
economic situation, many interventions must be tailored specifically for one patient and will not 
generalize to other patients. 
To discover if the mechanism subserving a capacity such as ToM is domain-specific 
modules (and dissociable from other capacities) one should engage in a study of individuals with 
a specific deficit that they have in (near) isolation. Since autism is not a unified syndrome, if we 
studied mixed groups and looked for main effects from averages of their behavioral performance, 
we would lose information relevant to discovering whether capacities such as ToM are 
dissociated from other higher-level capacities or lower-level deficits. There is a large literature 
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devoted to the inferences made from single-patient studies (e.g., Caramazza 1986; Caramazza & 
McCloskey 1988; Glymour 2001, ch. 11). I am not advancing the view held by Caramazza and 
colleagues where only single-patient studies are appropriate for making inferences to cognitive 
architecture, i.e., what some call the “radical view” (Robertson et al. 1993). To discover 
underlying cognitive architecture, one should make inferences from studies of individuals or 
groups of individuals who share unique profiles where one deficit is present in the absence of 
others. Doing this requires that one have rigorous screening protocols to be sure there is a high 
degree of overlap among subjects (Robertson et al. 1993, 716). 
We may find only a few individuals who exhibit a ToM deficit in the absence of nearly 
all of the other deficits associated with autism, but this is not problematic for making an 
inference from these cases to a claim about cognitive architecture. Finding just one case would 
license such an inference. The form of this inference is as follows:   
1. Individual A has a deficit of capacity X and does not display any other (salient) 
deficits;  
2. Given the absence of other deficits, capacity X in individual A must be dissociated 
from other capacities and subserved by a domain-specific module;  
3. Thus, capacity X must, in individuals B, C, D, […], be dissociated from other 
capacities and subserved by a domain-specific module.  
This is an inference that moves from a claim about an individual, or possibly a group with a high 
degree of similarity in their capacities and deficits to a general claim about human cognitive 
architecture. Whether deficit X is, in fact, often or even almost always comorbid with deficits Y 
and Z is irrelevant for judging whether deficit X is caused by the failure of a dissociable piece 
(module) of cognitive architecture. If we attempted to make such an inference from a group of 
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heterogeneous individuals, e.g., a group where all members had a deficit of capacity X but many 
also had comorbid deficits in capacities Y, Z, P, or Q in various combinations, we would be 
unable to determine whether X is subserved by a dissociable module or by some combination of 
the other capacities of which the subjects also exhibited deficits.  
Researchers in cognitive neuroscience make a similar type of inference when examining 
individuals with a nearly isolated deficit to expose which brain structures subserve particular 
capacities. For example, research with amnesic patients who have damage to the hippocampal 
system suggests that declarative memory is dissociated from other types of memory, including 
memory related to skilled performances (for discussion, see Adams 2009). Although these cases 
often involve identifying behavioral deficits associated with damage to a particular anatomical 
area such as the hippocampal system, the point of analogy to autism remains—an inference from 
a case of an individual’s isolated deficit allows us to infer what the underlying structure is for 
others without that deficit. The famous case of H.M. is an example of such an inference (Scoville 
& Milner 1957). 
 
2.2 Explaining the ToM Deficit and Autism’s Status as a Spectrum Disorder 
I now want to connect these methodological issues to my argument for the modular 
explanation of the ToM deficit. Conceiving of autism as a spectrum makes the modular 
explanation of ToM deficits in individuals with autism more plausible than a non-modular 
explanation. Strangely, most philosophers and psychologists have neglected to consider that 
viewing autism as a spectrum has implications for the level of plausibility we should assign to 
the modular explanation of the ToM deficit. I sketch below the plausibility argument that I will 
provide in this section: 
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Plausibility Argument from the Claim that Autism is a Spectrum Disorder 
 
1. If we had cases of individuals with a ToM deficit in complete isolation, this would 
settle the debate in favor of the domain-specific, higher-level ToM explanation; 
 
2. We do not have a study of any individual fitting the description in #1; 
 
3. However, we do have sufficient empirical support for identifying autism as a spectrum 
disorder, and each symptom of a spectrum disorder can occur independently of the other 
symptoms; 
 
4. From #3 it follows that it is plausible that in some individuals the ToM deficit occurs 
in isolation, though perhaps infrequently;  
 
5. From #4 it follows that the most plausible explanation for ToM capacity appeals to a 
domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. 
 
Researchers have come close to finding higher-functioning individuals who possess the 
ToM deficit in near isolation, but no one to my knowledge has studied an individual with this 
deficit in complete isolation of other salient deficits. The three individuals in Baron-Cohen et 
al.’s (1999) study, which I will discuss in more detail below in the next section, were recognized 
as a “rare opportunity” due to the near isolation of their ToM deficit, but even these individuals 
had deficits in other areas related to the autism spectrum. For example, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999) report that subject GC had some level of social interaction deficit. GC had difficulty 
understanding social norms, and in college he would physically remove anyone using a computer 
when he desired to use it (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999, 476-477). Thus, GC and the other two 
subjects in this study only approximate subjects with an isolated ToM deficit. 
Even in the absence of studying such individuals, we can evaluate the plausibility of the 
modular explanation of ToM by looking at autism’s status as a spectrum disorder. Large-scale 
empirical studies guided the transition from viewing autism as a uniform syndrome to a 
spectrum. The current guidelines for diagnosing autism in the DSM-IV are a significant 
improvement over those in the DSM-III-R, the latter of which had diagnostic criteria that were 
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too broad and resulted in a large number of false positives (Factor et al. 1989; Volkmar et al. 
1992). Volkmar et al. (1994) tested possible definitions for the DSM-IV on 977 subjects, helping 
confirm that the DSM-IV criteria had much more predictive power and sensitivity than previous 
criteria. 
Volkmar et al.’s (1994) field test established that the DSM-IV criteria are highly 
successful at diagnosing individuals with “classic autism.”  However, as Tanguay et al. note, 
there are many “individuals who present with symptoms clearly resembling those of the more 
classic autistic cases, but for whom the diagnosis cannot be made” (1998, 272). These 
individuals fall outside the current criteria because their symptoms are either not severe enough 
or because their symptoms fall into only one or two of the three domains required for an autism 
diagnosis. Numerous large-scale studies have led many to hold that autism is best understood as 
a spectrum and should be categorized dimensionally, not categorically (for this distinction, see 
fn. 3; for recent treatment with a study of 140 children and adolescents, see Kamp-Becker et al. 
2010). The inference made in these studies to identify autism as a spectrum is an instance of the 
kind discussed in the subsection above under diagnosing. 
Most individuals on the autism spectrum will be grouped together around commonly-held 
sets of deficits, but individuals with “subthreshold symptomatology,” who exhibit deficits in only 
two out of the three symptom domains, are not at all uncommon (Bishop 2000, 259). There also 
will be outliers who have symptoms from only one of the three domains. Since autism is a 
spectrum disorder, any of its symptoms can occur in isolation of each other, as psychologist 
Dorothy Bishop argues:   
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“[…] there is no necessary association between the three domains of impairment that 
characterize autism: They can be dissociated, especially in higher-functioning 
individuals. (Bishop 2000, 259) 
Psychiatrist Lorna Wing makes a similar point:  “[…] psychological impairments in autism and 
related conditions can vary independently of each other. Also, any combination may be found…” 
(Wing 1988, 98). Thus, it is likely that there will be outliers that exhibit only a ToM deficit and 
no others, though such cases may occur very infrequently. 
We are now at a point where we can evaluate whether the explanation that appeals to a 
domain-specific, higher-level ToM module is more plausible than other potential explanations. I 
argue that we may legitimately infer that the ToM modular explanation is more plausible than 
other explanations from the likelihood that there are individuals with a ToM deficit and no other 
related deficits. If we located such an individual, then studying him or her would decide the 
matter, but since we have not done so we must make the inference from the likelihood that such 
an individual exists. The form of this inference is similar to the kind described under discovering 
cognitive architecture in the previous subsection, but we are able to infer only the plausible 
underlying architecture from the likely existence of the individual with an isolated ToM deficit. 
Thus, I argue that the domain-specific, higher-level ToM module explanation is more plausible 
than a non-modular explanation, such as the one I will discuss in the next section. 
 
 
3. Can We Explain the ToM deficit by Appealing only to Lower-Level Deficits? 
In a series of recent papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone (hereafter G&S; Gerrans 2002; 
Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; G&S 2008) argue for a non-modular explanation of ToM. Such 
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an account threatens the explanation that I offer in the previous section. In this section, I provide 
reasons to reject their account, which they describe in the most detail in their 2008 paper.
7
 This 
section is not designed merely to criticize G&S (2008) in the interest of shoring up my 
explanation; rather, throughout this section I provide positive empirical evidence for the modular 
explanation of ToM by appealing to recent studies on auditory and visual processing that G&S 
(2008) do not discuss. 
G&S (2008) hope to explain the ToM deficit by appealing to lower-level deficiencies 
present early in development that have cascading effects throughout the development of the child 
with autism. G&S make this claim in the following quotation:  “[i]t is their [i.e., domain-specific 
and domain-general systems] interaction in development, rather than the maturation of a 
mindreading module, which explains the emergence of ToM” (2008, 122; emphasis added). 
Although they claim that development is a key component of their explanation, Gerrans and 
Stone do not, in fact, appeal to development when they attempt to explain several empirical 
studies (I outline this interpretational claim in more detail in Adams forthcoming). Instead, when 
they attend to the results of empirical studies they appeal only to lower-level deficits when 
explaining subjects’ ToM behavior.   
Given that development does not play a role in their explanations of relevant empirical 
studies, I propose to interpret G&S as offering what I call a synchronic explanation of the ToM 
deficit.
8
 On the synchronic account, ToM deficits are best explained by appealing only to lower-
level deficits in persons with autism regardless of their stage of development (e.g., facial 
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 I outline my criticisms of G&S’s (2008) account in more detail in Adams (forthcoming). 
8
 In Adams (forthcoming), I provide additional worries facing a diachronic developmental 
account such as what Gerrans and Stone (2008) view themselves as providing. For similar 
concerns related to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1998) developmental explanation of Williams Syndrome, 
see Machery (Forthcoming). 
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processing deficits). I will now examine a key study that G&S discuss and several that G&S do 
not discuss, arguing that they are best explained by appealing to a higher-level, domain-specific 
ToM module and not by appealing only to lower-level deficits.  
 G&S (2008, 132-133) discuss three case studies of very high-functioning individuals on 
the autism spectrum; two college students (a computer science student and a physics student) and 
a mathematics professor who had won the Fields Medal (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999). Baron-Cohen 
et al. (1999) administered three tests to the subjects:  a folk psychology test (ToM), a folk 
physics test (basic problem solving about the physical world), and an executive function test 
(Tower of Hanoi test). The first test is the most relevant to the present discussion. Subjects were 
presented with 36 photographs of the eye region and asked to choose the word that best 
described what the person in the photograph was thinking or feeling (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999, 
479); this is called the “reading the mind in the eyes” test (see Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001). Subjects performed well on the tests of executive function and folk physics, 
but they all exhibited deficits on the ToM test. 
 G&S (2008, 133) argue that since the ToM test in Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) study 
isolated the eye region, we can explain subjects’ difficulty in identifying emotions by appeal 
only to a lower-level deficit: 
…all three had difficulty in inferring what someone was feeling, or paying 
attention to, from pictures of the eye region of the face […] indicating a problem 
with lower-level domain-specific capacities for face and gaze processing rather 
than MR [metarepresentation]. (2008, 133; emphasis added) 
17 
Notably, G&S do not discuss how development contributes to their explanation, confirming that 
lower-level deficits are doing the explanatory work in their account.
9
 
 There is a problem with G&S’s interpretation of this study; they neglect to mention a 
relevant control task. To rule out the existence of some facial or gaze processing deficit, the 
subjects and the control group were asked to identify the gender of individuals by viewing only 
their eye region. On this task, the three subjects performed at the same level as the control group, 
but all three scored significantly below the mean of the control group on the ToM task (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1999, 479-480). Since the subjects performed as well as the control group on a 
general facial-processing task not related to emotion, the ToM deficits exhibited by these 
subjects are not likely due to a lower-level deficit related to facial or gaze processing. 
 Surprisingly, G&S (2008) do not address this aspect of the study, but one can imagine 
their potential response. They might grant that the control task does rule out that the subjects 
were generally impaired at facial processing, but it does not rule out that their poor performance 
on the ToM task could be due to a more domain-specific, lower-level impairment affecting only 
the facial processing of emotions. That is, though some elements of facial processing may be 
intact (i.e., processing of facial features sufficient enough to determine someone’s gender), there 
is a domain-specific, lower-level component of facial processing that provides inputs of facial 
emotions.  
 This potential reply from G&S argues that Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) control task does 
not allow us to determine whether the ToM deficits are due to the failure of a higher-level, 
domain-specific ToM module or of a lower-level, domain-specific face-related, emotion-
                                                          
9
 Similarly, when they attempt to explain behavior in other studies that I will not discuss, G&S 
(2008, 131) appeal only to “impaired low-level domain-specific mechanisms,” e.g., when 
explaining differences in performance between false-belief tests and false-photograph tests. 
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processing module. Recent studies in facial and auditory processing that I will discuss now lend 
support to the former over the latter. 
 Two recent studies (Lahaie et al. 2006; Humphreys et al. 2007) of facial processing by 
higher-functioning individuals on the autism spectrum suggest that, though some lower-
functioning persons with autism have difficulty with facial processing, in higher-functioning 
individuals the ToM deficit may be dissociated from facial-processing deficits. Lahaie et al 
(2006) used two tests to determine whether subjects’ configural facial processing and response to 
the priming of facial parts differed significantly from the control group. The first test was a 
standard inverted-face design where participants matched upright and inverted faces. Face 
inversion is known to disrupt facial recognition because it inhibits normal configural processing 
of facial features.  
In previous studies of the face inversion effect, subjects with autism performed better 
than controls in recognizing inverted faces but similarly or worse than controls with upright 
faces, causing some to argue that persons with autism have a deficit in configural facial 
processing (Lahaie 2006, 31). In Lahaie et al.’s (2001) study, subjects with autism were shown 
both faces with neutral expressions (to prevent a potential confound from faces showing 
emotion) and non-facial stimuli, called Greebles, that would also be inverted. Given previous 
studies, Lahaie et al. expected that subjects with autism would not show an inversion effect, 
supporting the deficiency in configural facial processing posited by previous studies (Lahaie et 
al. 2001, 31). Instead, both the control group and the subjects with autism exhibited the face 
inversion effect, which supports the view that higher-functioning persons with autism do not 
have a configural facial processing deficit. Joseph and Tanaka (2003) report a similar finding. 
Lahaie et al. (2001, 33) explain the discrepancy between their findings and previous studies’ 
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findings by observing that previous studies attended only to subjects’ error rates while Lahaie et 
al. attended also to concurrent response times by both groups, and previous studies were based 
on too small a number of trials (2001, 33). 
Lahaie et al. (2006) designed the second test to determine whether subjects with autism 
would exhibit a priming effect similar to the control group. I will not discuss this second test in 
detail; the relevant result is that subjects with autism performed similarly to the control group on 
the priming task, suggesting that both groups benefited from being primed with configural 
information (Lahaie et al. 2006, 38). These findings suggest that individuals with autism do not 
have a configural facial processing deficit, but one might ask how configural facial processing is 
relevant to the “reading the mind in the eyes” test. It is relevant because Lahaie et al.’s (2006, 
38) study found that, contrary to previous studies, subjects with autism looked at the eye region 
of the face more than other areas of the face. Not only did subjects pay more attention to the eye 
region, but moreover after priming they processed the eye region better than other facial areas. 
Their overall performance at equal with the control group and their enhanced ability to process 
the eye region suggest not only that they lack a lower-level facial processing deficit but also that 
they process the eye region better than other facial regions. This lends validity to the 
methodology in the “reading the mind in the eyes” test and also weighs against G&S’s appeal to 
lower-level facial processing deficits to explain the ToM deficits in Baron-Cohen et al. (1999). 
Humphreys et al. (2007) investigated whether higher-functioning persons with autism 
were able to recognize morphs of six basic facial expressions discussed by Ekman (1972). These 
morphs were computer-generated continua of facial expressions, e.g., from fear to surprise. 
Differences in emotion identification using these morphs were present between subjects with 
autism and the control group, with the most significant differences being in the recognition of 
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90% fear, 70% fear, and 70% disgust (Humphreys et al. 2007, 690). To determine whether 
subjects with autism differed due to a facial-processing deficit, a second test was administered to 
both groups where participants examined facial expressions and determined if two expressions 
were the same or different. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in the ability to 
make fine-grained comparisons between facial expressions between the two groups. This 
suggests that the difficulty discriminating emotions subjects with autism exhibited in Humphreys 
et al.’s first test was not due to a lower-level perceptual deficit. 
Recent experiments on auditory processing by persons with autism provide further 
evidence for the modular ToM explanation and against an explanation appealing only to lower-
level deficits (also see Golan et al. 2007). Rutherford et al. (2002) expanded upon Baron-Cohen 
et al.’s “reading the mind in the eyes” test by administering an auditory test designed to test ToM 
capabilities. In the “reading the mind in the voice” test, higher-functioning subjects with autism 
listened to a recording of someone speaking and were asked to describe the speaker’s mental 
state (Rutherford et al. 2002, 190). Similar to the control test in the “reading the mind in the 
eyes” test, these subjects were asked to identify from two options the age range that best fit the 
age of the speaker. Subjects with autism were significantly impaired compared to controls in 
identifying the mental state of the speakers, but they did not differ significantly in assigning 
speakers to an age range. Rutherford et al. argue that these results suggest that the ToM deficit in 
higher-functioning persons with autism is amodal. This study is relevant to the present debate 
since the control task was designed to rule out lower-level auditory processing deficits, the sort 
of deficit to which G&S might appeal in a possible reply.  
Kleinman et al. (2001) desired both to confirm the earlier “reading the mind in the eyes” 
experiments by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997; 2001) and to determine whether higher-functioning 
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persons with autism would exhibit similar deficits in an auditory task. Kleinman et al.’s (2001) 
control task required subjects to identify a speaker’s gender from a recording. On the ToM task, 
subjects with autism performed significantly worse than the control group. On the control task, 
both groups scored above chance on the auditory task but neither group did so on the gender-
identification visual task, which Kleinman et al. (2001, 35) take to indicate that this is a difficult 
task for anyone, i.e., a floor effect concern. That subjects with autism scored above chance on the 
auditory control task suggests that a lower-level auditory deficit is not responsible for their 
difficulty on the auditory ToM task.
10
  
G&S could respond to these recent studies in two different ways. First, they could argue 
that though the studies discussed above seem to indicate that higher-functioning subjects with 
autism can have ToM deficits in the absence of lower-level visual or auditory processing deficits, 
this does not rule out the possibility of them having a higher-level deficit, e.g., with executive 
function. Second, they could accept the findings of these experiments but then posit a specialized 
lower-level module devoted only to processing emotional information in facial processing and 
another such module for auditory processing. Neither of these responses works, so I argue that 
the best explanation of the ToM deficit appeals to a higher-level, domain-specific ToM module. 
The first reply does not explain the behavior of the three subjects in Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999). The subjects were tested not only for ToM using the “reading the mind in the eyes” test 
but also for executive function capabilities using the Tower of Hanoi test. G&S could not appeal 
to the domain-general process of metarepresentation that they posit, since these three individuals 
are clearly skilled at advanced representation and at recursive computations, as G&S admit 
(2008, 133). Furthermore, a study of a subject with damage to the left amygdala suggests that 
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 Further studies supporting this conclusion include Golan et al. (2006) and Golan et al. (2008). 
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ToM is dissociated from executive function (Fine et al. 2001), and there are numerous other 
studies suggesting that young children diagnosed with autism do not exhibit executive function 
deficits (e.g., Griffith et al. 1999; Yerys et al. 2007).
11
 Thus, it seems that G&S cannot appeal to 
a higher-level, domain-general process to explain the subjects’ performance in Baron-Cohen et 
al.’s (1999) study. 
The second reply would strongly detract from the force of G&S’s argument. G&S (2008) 
emphasize that they are seeking a more parsimonious account of the ToM deficit in persons with 
autism by appealing to lower-level deficits. They emphasize their desire for parsimony with the 
cautionary phrase they co-opt:  modulae non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate (2008, 122). 
To explain the behavior of subjects with autism in the visual and auditory processing tasks, G&S 
would need to posit a deficit in a lower-level module for emotion processing for vision and a 
deficit in a lower-level module for emotion processing for hearing (while all other visual and 
auditory processing modules are intact). Rather than explaining these deficits by adding a 
module for each modality, we can straightforwardly explain these studies by appealing to a 
single higher-level, domain-specific ToM module that accounts for deficits both in visual and 
auditory tasks. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that the modular explanation of the ToM deficit in persons with 
autism is more plausible than a non-modular explanation, such as the putative explanation 
offered by G&S (2008). The plausibility of the modular account is supported by conceiving of 
                                                          
11
 For a review of the literature, see Hill (2004). 
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autism as a spectrum and by its ability to explain studies of higher-functioning individuals with 
autism. 
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